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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RONNIE LEE GARDNER,

:

Petitioner-Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

:

Case No. 910500

:

Category No. 3

v.
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of the
Utah State Prison, STATE OF
UTAH,

:
:

Respondent-Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a decision granting in part a
petition for postconviction relief.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992)
because the appeal is from a district court involving a capital
felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did trial counsel provide constitutionally

effective assistance regarding the testimony of Dr. Heinbecker?
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that
the deficient performance prejudiced him.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Strickland v.

Ineffective assistance of

counsel claims are mixed questions of fact and law.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

State v.

2.

Did appellate counsel provide constitutionally

effective assistance?

The same standard of review applies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, a
capital felony; attempted first degree murder; aggravated
kidnapping; escape; and possession of a dangerous weapon by an
incarcerated person and was sentenced to death on October 25,
1985 (Record [hereafter R.] at 2-3). He appealed his conviction
and sentence to the Utah Supreme Court which affirmed the
judgment in State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).

His subsequent petition for

rehearing was denied on November 15, 1989.

On April 16, 1990,

the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of
certiorari (R. at 3).
On July 16, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for
postconviction relief in the state trial court alleging violation
of his constitutional rights by:

1) use of hypnotically enhanced

testimony; 2) use of petitioner's inadmissible statements; 3) use
of excessive security measures; 4) failure to advise petitioner
of a right to testify; 5) violation of right to presence at
trial; 6) use of victim impact testimony; 7) insufficient
evidence of aggravating circumstances; 8) ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial; 9) ineffective assistance of counsel on
-2-

appeal; 10) failure to instruct the jury on statutory mitigating
circumstances; 11) failure to instruct the jury on the burden of
proof as to the existence of aggravating circumstances; 12)
consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances; 13)
unconstitutional death penalty scheme; 14) vagueness and
overbreadth of one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in
the capital homicide statute; 15) admission at sentencing of any
probative evidence regardless of the exclusionary rules of
evidence; and 16) failure to narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty (R. at 2-19).

A motion to stay execution

was granted on August 8, 1990 (R. at 36).
Respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on October 5, 1990 (R. at 87-95).

A hearing on the motion was

conducted on October 12, 1990, at which time petitioner moved to
amend his petition to include a claim of conflict of interest
involving his supplemental appellate counsel (R. at 307 and 30910).

An oral ruling which granted summary judgment in part and

denied it in part was pronounced at that hearing (R. at 309-10).
A formal order was signed on June 18, 1992 (R. at 484-85).
An evidentiary hearing on the remaining issues was
conducted on November 27-28, 1990> in the Third Judicial District
Court, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, district judge, presiding
(R. at 359 and 366-67).

In a memorandum decision issued July 26,

1991, the court denied in part and granted in part the
postconviction petition (R. at 487-520).

Respondent filed a

motion for new trial on August 5, 1991, which was denied on

-3-

October 7, 1991 (R. at 521 and 530). Respondent then filed this
appeal (R. at 532-33) and petitioner filed a cross-appeal (R. at
536-37).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The trial court granted the petitioner's writ on two
issues:

1) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial regarding

Dr. Heinbecker's testimony; and 2) ineffective assistance on
appeal.

This fact statement will only address those issues.
A.

Trial issue - Dr. Heinbecker's testimony.

On April 2, 1985, petitioner shot and killed an
attorney in the basement of the Third District Court building (R.
at 564). Andrew Valdez and James Valdez of Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association were appointed to represent petitioner (T.
at 616). Five weeks after the murder, on May 10, 1985, at the
request of petitioner's trial counsel, Dr. Mark Rindflesh
examined petitioner for the purpose of exploring a psychological
defense at trial (R. at 618, 658 and 774). At the evidentiary
hearing on this petition, Dr. Rindflesh did not recall having had
access to any records regarding petitioner's history (R. at 776),
although petitioner's records from the state hospital and the
reform school were subpoenaed by petitioner's trial counsel (R.
at 659). Dr« Rindflesh spent an hour and a half interviewing
petitioner but was not called to testify at trial (R. at 773-74
and 777). Trial counsel did not call him to testify because his
testimony would be more harmful than helpful (R. at 758). Dr.
Rindflesh told counsel that petitioner had no "significant
-4-

psychiatric disorders" but "that textbooks are written about
people like [petitioner], who basically have compulsive
behavioral problems" (R. at 719-20).
Both pretrial and during trial, counsel continued to
search for a psychological examiner who could bolster
petitioner's case.

Counsel reviewed a psychological evaluation

conducted at the prison by Dr. LaPray which included a battery of
tests (R. at 660). Counsel met with Dr. Agnes Plenk, but she
declined to be involved in the case (R. at 660-61 and 797). They
also approached another doctor, possibly Dr. Lebegue; however,
this doctor also declined to participate (R. at 662). Counsel
kept looking for an expert who would give a "different conclusion
other than a sociopath compulsive behavior, [which] is what
people were telling [counsel]" (R. at 662, 714-20 and 742). "It
wasn't a question of not calling [to find an expert].
question of getting some kind of favorable diagnosis."
666).

It was a
(R. at

Counsel sought to have the evaluations done in such a way

that the State would not have access to the results because they
were so unfavorable (R. at 740-42 and 759).
Counsel had difficulty finding anyone who would
associate with the case until they found Dr. Heinbecker, "late in
the case" (R. at 662). Dr. Heinbecker was new in the state and
even he originally declined to be involved (R. at 721 and 714).
Dr. Heinbecker had only 24 hours notice before he was called to
testify for petitioner at the penalty phase of his trial (R. at
750 and 671). He would have expected and preferred to have had

-5-

more time to prepare (R. at 754 and 721). Counsel did not ask
for a continuance to allow more preparation because they knew
"that it wouldn't have been continued.

Just the nature of the

case as it was going, the judge we had." (R. at 721). Counsel
debated about even calling Dr. Heinbecker because his testimony
had both favorable and unfavorable components (R. at 666 and 71314).
Once counsel contacted Dr. Heinbecker and overcame his
reluctance to participate (R. at 714), Dr. Heinbecker interviewed
petitioner and petitioner's mother and brother (R. at 750-52).
He also reviewed documents, including records of psychological
testing of petitioner done at the prison (R. at 750, 752 and
755).

At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Heinbecker agreed with

petitioner's counsel that it would have been "helpful" in
formulating his diagnosis to have administered some tests to
determine whether petitioner suffered from organic brain syndrome
(R. at 754-55).

However, there was no testimony that petitioner

had ever exhibited symptoms of organic brain syndrome or what
relevance such a condition could have had in his case.

In

addition, Dr, Heinbecker recalled reviewing the results of some
tests which had been administered to petitioner previously at the
prison; however, the doctor did not recall what particular test
results he reviewed (R. at 755). By inference, Dr. Heinbecker
did not recall whether the test results which may have helped in
diagnosing organic brain syndrome had been available for his
review.

-6-

B.

Appellate issue - failure to raise supplemental
claims.

Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (LDA) represented
petitioner at trial and, initially, on appeal.

Curtis Nessett,

who worked for LDA in 1985, prepared and filed petitioner's
opening brief (R. at 813). He spoke with petitioner at least
once, and possibly twice, about the issues to be raised on appeal
(R. at 813 and 636). Mr. Nessett did not recall petitioner
either objecting to any of the issues raised or asking for other
issues to be included (R. at 813-14).
Subsequently, in May or June of 1987, Joan Watt, also
of LDA, became involved in preparation of the reply brief and in
oral argument (R. at 779). Immediately prior to oral argument,
petitioner filed an allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel with this Court and asked that LDA be removed from his
case (R. at 781 and 638-39).

After discussion between counsel

and the Court, LDA was ordered to proceed with oral argument (R.
at 781 and 640). Ms. Watt participated in oral argument, then
oversaw a petition for rehearing and subsequent petition for writ
of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court (R, at 781-82).
Based on petitioner's allegation of ineffectiveness, this Court
appointed Ed Brass to review and, if appropriate, file a
supplemental appellate brief on the issue of ineffective trial
counsel (R. at 782, 824 and 640-41).

After consulting on the

issue with other attorneys, none of which were with LDA, Mr.
Brass filed a supplemental brief on that single issue (R. at 824
and 641). According to petitioner, Mr. Brass told him that "it
-7-

wasn't an appropriate time . . . to file a brief on the
ineffective assistance of counsel."

(R. at 642).*

No oral

argument occurred on that supplemental issue (R. at 824). This
Court did review the supplemental briefing on the claim of
ineffective assistance.

The claim based on a failure to object

to the testimony of an officer, Dr. Heinbecker, and a member of
the Board of Pardons was addressed and rejected for failure to
demonstrate prejudice.

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 288.

"Defendant makes other allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
them."

However, no record was made on which we can review

Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Trial counsel was not ineffective on the basis of the

use of Dr. Heinbecker's testimony.

There is a strong presumption

that counsel's last minute contact with Dr. Heinbecker was
strategic.

Even if it were not a strategic decision, the

evidence demonstrates that counsel made every reasonable effort
to find psychological experts who would help rather than harm
petitioner's case.

Finally, even if counsel's performance was

deficient, the postconviction court erred in declaring counsel
ineffective without requiring any showing of prejudice to
petitioner arising from counsel's performance.

Petitioner has

shown no likelihood of a different result at trial had Dr.
Heinbecker been given more time to evaluate petitioner.
Evidently, that statement to petitioner was based on Mr.
Brass's conclusion that no record had been developed in the trial
court to support petitioner's allegations of ineffective counsel.
-8-

The court's decision on the issue of ineffective
appellate counsel is also erroneous.

The court apparently

determined that appellate counsel's performance was deficient
because he addressed only a limited issue in the supplemental
brief he filed.

Given that this Court directed the supplemental

appellate counsel to address petitioner's ineffective trial
counsel claim, it was not deficient performance for counsel to
limit himself to that issue.

Even if counsel's performance was

deficient, petitioner has not established prejudice.

The

postconviction court addressed each of the issues petitioner
claims should have been raised on appeal and, except for one,
decided them adversely to petitioner.

The one issue decided in

petitioner's favor was that of the last minute contact with Dr.
Heinbecker.

As argued in Point I, there was no ineffective

assistance displayed in the investigation and use of
psychological testimony.

Consequently, there can be no prejudice

in counsel's failure to raise the issues in the original appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING POSTCONVICTION
RELIEF ON THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL
REGARDING THE USE OF DR. HEINBECKER.
Although the court's decision is unclear, it appears
that the court determined that trial counsel had provided
ineffective assistance in the investigation and use of mental
health experts in presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty
hearing (R. at 509-10; see Addendum A),
-9-

This Court has held that

ineffective assistance of counsel claims
present a mixed question of fact and law.
Therefore, in a situation where a trial court
has previously heard a motion, based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing
courts are free to make an independent
determination of a trial court's conclusions.
The factual findings of the trial court,
however, shall not be set aside on appeal
unless clearly erroneous.
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (footnotes
omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984)).

This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining

ineffectiveness from Strickland.

That test is:

"First, the [petitioner] must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the [petitioner] by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
[petitioner] must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable."
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
Petitioner has the burden of meeting both parts of the
test.
[I]n order to meet the first part of this
test a [petitioner] must "identify the acts
or omissions" which, under the circumstances,
"show that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of
reasonableness." . . . The appellate court
must . . . "indulge in the strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is the [petitioner] must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action 'might be considered
sound trial strategy.'"
-10-

Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68890).

The standard for judging counsel's performance is that of

reasonableness.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.

Except in certain circumstances which are not alleged
in this case, petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice.
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186, n.20.

To prove prejudice, petitioner

"must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
"[T]hese principles are not to be applied as a
mechanical test."

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

This Court
"need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining
the prejudice suffered by [petitioner] as a
result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so,
that course should be followed."
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
A.

Performance prong.

In the present case, the district court violated these
principles when it concluded that trial counsel had provided
ineffective assistance in the area of mental health investigation
and testimony.

(R. at 509-10; see Addendum A).

The court's

finding that trial counsel's perfonnance in seeking and calling a
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mental health expert is not supported by the evidence adduced at
the evidentiary hearing.
The evidence demonstrates that trial counsel expended
every reasonable effort to find a psychological expert to testify
on petitioner's behalf.

Within five weeks of the crime, they had

contacted Dr. Rindflesh and had him examine petitioner (R. 618,
658 and at 774). The decision not to call him to testify at
trial was sound trial strategy because his testimony would have
been more harmful than helpful (R. at 758). Dr. Rindflesh told
counsel that petitioner had no "significant psychiatric disorder"
but "that textbooks are written about people like [petitioner],
who basically have compulsive behavioral problems" (R. at 71920).

Counsel's continuing search for helpful psychological

testimony led them to review a psychological evaluation conducted
at the prison by Dr. LaPray (R. at 660). They met with Dr. Agnes
Plenk, who declined to be involved in the case (R. at 660-61 and
797).

They contacted another doctor, possibly Dr. Lebegue, who

also declined to participate (R. at 662). Every expert they
approached told them that petitioner exhibited "sociopath
compulsive behavior" (R. at 662, 714-20 and 742). As counsel
testified, "It wasn't a question of not calling [to find an
expert].

It was a question of getting some kind of favorable

diagnosis."

(R. at 666). All the while, the contacts with

experts were conducted in a way which would preclude the
prosecution from learning about the evaluation results (R. at
740-42 and 759). Again, this was sound trial strategy given the
-12-

unfavorable results counsel was getting from the experts (R. at
740-42).
After the repeated attempts to find anyone who would
associate themselves with the case and would testify favorably
failed, counsel found Dr. Heinbecker "late in the case" (R. at
662).

Dr. Heinbecker had just moved to Utah and he also was

reluctant to become involved (R. at 721 and 714). Counsel had to
overcome that reluctance before Dr. Heinbecker would even
interview petitioner (R. at 714). Although Dr. Heinbecker would
have expected and preferred to have more time to prepare to
testify, counsel knew that a request for a continuance would have
been futile (R. at 721). Dr. Heinbecker's evaluation was both
favorable and unfavorable; however, given the unsuccessful
attempts to find an expert who would testify positively for
petitioner, counsel chose to call Dr. Heinbecker as a witness in
the penalty hearing (R. at 666 and 713-14).
The evidence reveals that petitioner's trial counsel
made every reasonable effort to present psychological testimony.
Some of the experts refused to associate with the case; others
evaluated petitioner and had nothing favorable to testify to.
Finally, counsel found a psychiatrist new to the state who,
though reluctant, did evaluate petitioner and prepare to testify
at the penalty phase.

The rushed involvement of Dr. Heinbecker

was not evidence of deficient performance by counsel; instead, it
demonstrated counsel's continuing effort throughout trial to find
favorable testimony.

The fact that counsel was unable to obtain
-13-

expert testimony prior to that point was based on the refusal by
the experts to participate or on unfavorable evaluations.

It was

not based on any lack of effort by counsel.
B»

Prejudice prong.

Even if counsel's performance had been deficient,
petitioner has not proven any prejudice based on his counsel's
actions in seeking psychological experts. As in State v. Lovell,
758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988), petitioner
has made no effort to delineate any prejudice
he suffered as the result of ineffectiveness
of counsel. It is not enough to claim that
the alleged ineffectiveness had some
conceivable impact on the outcome of the
trial. The claim may not be speculative, but
must demonstrate a reality sufficient to
overcome the strong presumption that counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised
reasonable professional judgment.
Id. at 913 (footnote omitted).

At the evidentiary hearing,

petitioner failed to demonstrate how trial counsel's largely
unsuccessful attempts to find an expert who would testify
positively for petitioner, which culminated in the late discovery
of Dr. Heinbecker, prejudiced him.

Petitioner did not present

any evidence that there was any information that an expert could
have produced, given more time, which would have changed the
outcome of the sentencing hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner's counsel asked
Dr. Heinbecker if he was familiar with the term "organic brain
syndrome," and the methods used to determine whether a person has
the syndrome (R. at 754-55).

However, no attempt was made to

explain this condition or how it applied to petitioner's case.
-14-

The district court ignored that lack of relevance in its decision
when it agreed with petitioner that the "deprivation of adequate
evaluations . . . prevented petitioner from presenting any
evidence of possible organic brain damage or other mitigating
information" (R. at 510). The court's analysis is totally
speculative.

There is no evidence in the record that organic

brain syndrome or other mitigating information exists; in fact,
the evidence shows that Dr. Rindflesh told trial counsel that
petitioner suffered from "no significant psychiatric disorders"
(R. at 719). There is no evidence before this Court supporting
the district court's speculation that more time or testing might
have revealed some mitigating evidence for the penalty hearing.
The district court's conclusion that counsel was ineffective
based on this speculation is erroneous.

State v. Lovell, 758

P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988).
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING POSTCONVICTION
RELIEF ON THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE APPELLATE
COUNSEL.
The court also granted postconviction relief on the
claim of ineffective appellate counsel.

The same standard of

review and standard for determining the effectiveness of counsel
addressed in the previous point apply here.
After the opening brief was filed by LDA, petitioner
filed a pro se document with this Court which alleged ineffective
assistance by trial counsel (R. at 780 and 636-39).

This Court

appointed Ed Brass as supplemental counsel to address the claim
-15-

of ineffective assistance (R. at 640 and 821). After
consultation with other attorneys (not associated with LDA), Mr.
Brass filed a supplemental brief which stated that petitioner's
claims were mostly premature because there was no record support
for them at trial (R. at 642 and 825).
A.

Performance prong.

Mr. Brass was appointed by this Court shortly before
oral argument to address petitioner's claim that his trial
counsel had provided ineffective assistance.

After an

independent review of the specific claims raised by petitioner,
Mr. Brass concluded that no record support had been established
for most of those claims; consequently, it would be premature,
and ineffectual, to raise them at that point (R. at 642 and 825).
This Court addressed the supplemental claim and rejected it for
failure to establish prejudice on certain allegations and failure
to provide record support for the other allegations.

State v.

Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 288 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S.
1090 (1990).
In the postconviction proceeding, the district court
was troubled by the fact that LDA remained on the case after Mr.
Brass was appointed; however, that apparently was the direction
received from this Court.

Just before oral argument, petitioner

filed a requ€*st for new counsel; LDA was ordered to continue with
oral argument on the appellate issues raised in its opening brief
(R. at 781 and 789-90).

Mr. Brass subsequently filed his

supplemental brief regarding the ineffectiveness claim (R. at
•16-

782).

After this Court's decision on the initial appeal, LDA

prepared a petition for rehearing and a subsequent petition for
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court (R. at 78182).

LDA did not file those petitions; instead, they were sent

to Mr. Brass who reviewed and approved them for filing (R. at
827).

Given the status of the case at that point, this did not

constitute a failure to independently assess the merits of
petitioner's case.

This Court's opinion on petitioner's direct

appeal dealt almost exclusively with the issues raised in LDA's
opening brief; the claims of ineffective trial counsel had
summarily been disposed of on the prejudice prong of Strickland
and on the basis of lack of record to support most of the claims.
At the time of the petition for rehearing and petition for writ
of certiorari, there still was little or no record support for
the ineffectiveness claim•
The district court apparently misconstrues the purpose
for which Mr. Brass was appointed.

He was directed to address

petitioner's supplemental claim of ineffective assistance by
trial counsel; he was not directed to search for other possible
appealable issues (R. at 821-22).

Mr. Brass followed the mandate

from this Court; the fact that he did not go beyond it does not
demonstrate that his performance was deficient.
B.

Prejudice prong.

The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus on
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal because
the court found that supplemental counsel had not conducted an
-17-

independent investigation of appealable issues and researched and
prepared independent appellate documents (R. at 515; see Addendum
B).

However, the court then stated:
Petitioner's other issues which he claims
he was unable to address on appeal have
already been dealt with in this decision, and
therefore need not be addressed any further.

(R. at 515). In other words, all of the issues petitioner claims
independent appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal
were raised in this proceeding2 and all but one were decided
adversely to petitioner.

The one on which petitioner prevailed

was the issue of ineffectiveness for failure to obtain a
psychological expert earlier in petitioner's trial.

That issue

was addressed in Point I and, as argued there, the court erred in
granting the writ on that point.

Since petitioner cannot prevail

on any of the issues which he claims should have been raised in
the original appeal, and which he raised in the habeas corpus
proceeding, there is no prejudice in appellate counsel's failure
to raise them.

Since there is no prejudice, the court erred in

holding that appellate counsel had provided ineffective
assistance.

2

The postconviction proceeding provided petitioner the
opportunity to create the record support for his claims that was
lacking on direct appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the decision of the trial court and deny
plaintiff's petition for postconviction relief.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q3&* day of July,
1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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Court rules though there may be some evidence of a conflict and
as a result, some deficiency in representation, because of the
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt, there is
no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt*

E-

Penalty phase
First

claim:

There

evidence in mitigation.

was

insufficient

presentation

of

That "Effective representation of the

accused in a capital case demands that counsel challenge the
State's

aggravating

evidence

and

present

understandable theory of mitigation.11
was not done.
relating

to

a

cohesive

and

Petitioner contends this

Primarily, there was inadequate investigation
petitioner's

mental

health

prior

to

trial.

Whatever evidence was presented was inadequate —

too little

and

Dr.

too

late.

Heinbecker's
sufficient

There

testimony.
medical

or

is
Was

dispute
there

psychological

regarding
sufficient
evaluations

Peter

time

and

for

Dr.

Heinbecker to adequately and completely testify in behalf of
petitioner?

The Court is of the opinion there was not.

Dr.

Heinbecker was contacted a mere 24 hours before he testified.

GARDNER V. HOLDEN

PAGE 24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

During that time he "was able only to examine some of the
records, interview Mr. Gardner for about one hour, and talk to
his mother and brother for a total of 2.5 hours."

Further,

"Dr. Heinbecker testified that, in a case of this significance,
he would have expected more time to prepare his evaluation."
(Opening Brief, p. 26).
Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist, evaluated petitioner in
May

1985.

He

apparently

was

not

petitioner (Opening Brief, p. 28).
to

evaluate

declined.

or

No

testify

in

behalf

asked

to

testify

for

Dr. Agnes Plenk was asked
of

petitioner,

but

she

further effort was made to seek professional

assistance for petitioner, nor seek State assistance in doing
so.

In addition, present counsel's efforts to secure expert

testimony for petitioner's evaluation was opposed by the State
and sustained by this Court.

As a result, no satisfactory

mental health evaluation of petitioner has ever been available
to petitioner to present at any hearing.
Petitioner contends the deprivation of adequate evaluations
has

prevented

petitioner

from

possible organic brain damage
which

further

prevented

presenting

any

evidence

of

or other mitigating information

presentation

understandable theory of mitigation."

of

"a

cohesive

The Court agrees.

and
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paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), and they are, therefore, denied
on their merits.

(I) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL
Based on Mr. Ed Brass's testimony and the submitted briefs,
this Court is of the opinion there was no conflict of interest
by Mr. Brass having previously represented Carma Hainsworth and
having

subsequently

considered

the

represented

matter

of

petitioner.

identification

of

The
the

Court

has

person

who

handed petitioner the gun, and the effect on the jury which
directly

involves

Mr.

Brass'

client,

Carma

Hainsworth.

Although not brought to the Supreme Court's attention, nor a
record made of this, nor waiver received from petitioner, the
Court is of the opinion Mr. Brass had analyzed the situation
and determined there was no conflict and the Court agrees with
his analyses.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention there exists
a conflict of interest on direct appeal from the trial court,
as well as ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from the
trial

court

to

the

Supreme

Court.

Neither

Mr.

Brass, or
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appellate counsel Ms. Watt, were at fault, but a victim of
circumstances.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that unusual
circumstances existed to excuse the failure of petitioner to
raise issues on appeal.
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt
Lake
Legal
Defenders
Association
based
on
petitioner's
claim
he
received
ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial and on direct
appeal.
Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief
arguing there was no evidentiary record to frame
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In addition, it is not contested that Mr. Brass
was appointed by the Supreme Court's order, a
copy of which order he claims not to have
received, to file a supplemental brief to address
matters not previously addressed. Consequently,
based on a telephone conversation with Chief
Justice Hall, he understood he was appointed only
to address the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial. Mr. Brass claims to not have
received a copy of its opinion.
A further problem exists.
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt
Lake County Legal Defenders Association was not
scrupulously
honored.
Attorney
Joan
Watt
testified she was instructed in an informal
telephone call from the Supreme Court's clerk to
file the appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's
behalf
after
the
decision
affirming
his
conviction and sentence was announced. Although
the Supreme Court had decided that he was
entitled
to
independent
counsel
on
the
ineffective assistance issue, Ms. Watt also
prepared the Supplemental Petition for Rehearing
and Supplemental Reply to State's Response to
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, which were
signed and filed by Mr. Brass.

Based
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on Mr. Brass' understanding,

he was

appointed

to

represent petitioner on the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel

at

trial

and,

further,

prepared

by the Salt Lake Legal

appellate

pleadings

were

Defenders Association, but

signed by Mr. Brass, even though the Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association

had

previously

been

discharged

in

representing

petitioner.

This Court is of the opinion petitioner received

ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because all
appealable issues were not addressed and there is a question of
whether issues appealed were properly addressed by independent
counsel because pleadings were prepared by the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association which had previously been discharged on
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
The Court grants petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus on the
issue

of

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

on

appeal.

Petitioner should have the opportunity to appeal all issues to
the Utah State Supreme Court by independent counsel on all
issues based
appealable

on

independent

issues

and

based

counsel's
on

own

investigation

independent

counsel's

of
own

research and preparation of appellate documents.
Petitioner's other issues which he claims he was unable to
address

on

appeal

have

already

been

dealt

with

in

decision, and therefore need not be addressed any further.

this

